Els Lecoutere Ppt

Slideshow Transcript

1. Slide 1: Water Security in rural Tanzania Social Status and Distributive Conflicts in Irrigation Systems: A Field Experiment Els Lecoutere Co-authors: Ben D’Exelle, Björn Van Campenhout Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 1
2. Slide 2: Access to irrigation water • Controlled access to water essential for agriculture • Self-governed ‘traditional’ irrigation in SSA • Local common pool resource institutions – Efficient? – Sustainable use? – Equitable distribution? Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 2
3. Slide 3: Research questions • How are distributive conflicts dealt with? • What is influence of local power structure? – Does appropriation behavior of upstream users differ according to their relative social status position in society? – Is ‘right enforcement’ behavior of downstream users different according to their relative social status position in society? Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 3
4. Slide 4: Literature • Ethnographic case studies and socio-political studies: – Institutions along power lines – Results in inequitable distribution, insecure water access for many • NIE: assumption of homogeneous communities and ‘common’ rules of the game => depoliticized • Recent NIE: impact of heterogeneity in society on efficiency and sustainability of collective action (Baland et al., 2007) • Little attention for – Equity – Appropriation model – Internalised social embeddedness and its effect on adherence to norms and behaviour Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 4
5. Slide 5: Literature (cont.) • Influence social embeddedness on behaviour – Subjective utility (Okuno-Fujiwara, 2002) – e.g. effect different ability and status seeking on contribution to common good (Platteau and Seki, 2007) – differences in wealth: different behaviour in experiment (Cardenas, 2003) • Social psychology: effect of power and status on behaviour • Experimental economics: e.g. ultimatum game: both low and high social status more generous to high social status of receiver (Ball and Eckel, 1998) Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 5
6. Slide 6: Research instruments • Social status ranking – Five irrigation schemes in rural Mufindi, Southern Highlands, Tanzania – Ranking by community of irrigation users (four groups per scheme) • Field experiment – repeated distribution game: 13 groups with max 7 pairs of permanent upstream and downstream user – Upstream decides on water intake and earns accordingly – Downstream reacts on his water allocation and earnings: silent, communicates (dis)satisfaction or punishment via mediator – Five rounds with abundant water, ten rounds water scarcity – Water scarcity: productivity threshold can not be reached by both players Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 6
7. Slide 7: Research hypotheses • Appropriation behavior of upstream – Egalitarian norms, few adhere to selfishness axiom – Efficiency: minimum water to downstream to reach productivity threshold – In times of scarcity: fairness and efficiency are conflicting motives... Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 7
8. Slide 8: Research hypotheses • Effect of social status of upstream user – Higher social status more selfish • Less adherence to (egalitarian) norms • Exploits power, feels s/he deserves more • Less consideration for others’ outcome – Higher social status more fair or altruist: • comfortable position and social esteem – Lower social status more fair or altruist: • More cautious about others’ outcome because dependency • Feels others deserve and demand more Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 8
9. Slide 9: Research hypotheses • ‘Right enforcement’ behavior of downstream and effect of social status – High social status • Less use of mediator, enough ‘power’ to influence others him/herself – Low social status • More use of mediator because feeling of powerlessness • Reluctance of direct confrontation through communication Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 9
10. Slide 10: Some results: distribution • Selfishness axiom does not apply: strong egalitarian norms • Even under scarcity: equal split preferred at high efficiency costs • Upstream users with high social status more selfish, low social status more altruist Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 10
11. Slide 11: Some results: strategy changes • Under scarcity: 20% from fair to selfish • Small percentage rotation • Upstream users high and middle social status more sensitive to punishment and dissatisfaction and adapt hours of water used (social esteem by being fair?) • Low social status upstream less prone to change distribution when punished or dissatisfaction (on the verge of sustainable livelihood?) Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 11
12. Slide 12: Some results: reaction by downstream • High social status downstream user: prefer to communicate dissatisfaction rather than calling mediator • Low social status: more via mediator then express dissatisfaction • Low social status downstream user: preference to remain silent, even when inequality in his/her advantage (not to wake sleeping dogs?) • Under abundance: men more inclined to punish then communicate dissatisfaction Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 12
13. Slide 13: Policy implications • Equal sharing the norm even under scarcity • Solid base for promoting more efficient rotation schemes • Empowerment of low social status users to speak up against inequality Conflict Research Group | Universiteit Gent 13